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1 Introduction
The UK has been experiencing a prolonged period of stagnated business investment. Fig.1 illustrates
business investment over 1992-2016 and shows that investment has been persistently below the pre-
crisis trend since 2007.
Figure 1: UK business investment. Author’s calculation based on data from the ONS.
Hayashi (1982) proves that the ratio of the market value to the replacement cost of capital,
average Q, is positively related to the investment rate insofar that market valuation captures
information regarding expected profitability. Theoretically, the weakness of investment arises from
either high cost of capital or low profitability. However, neither of the two arguments provides
satisfactory explanation (e.g., Gutiérrez & Philippon (2017)). The rapid growth of intangible
economies leads to a significant increase in investment on intangible capital such as R&D and
patents (Haskel & Westlake (2018)). In recent years the literature shows that sluggish fixed
investment results from firms substituting physical capital with intangibles. Gutiérrez &
Philippon (2017) show that intangibles partially explain the under-investment trend at the
industry-level. Alexander & Eberly (2018) emphasize that the declining physical investment is due
to capital composition shifts from physical capital to intangible capital. Crouzet & Eberly (2019)
find that the investment gap is reduced at both the firm-level and industry-level by accounting for
the rise in intangibles. As shown by Crouzet & Eberly (2019), omitting intangibles in the Q-model
of investment would result in underestimation of capital stock. Furthermore, Q would tend to
overestimate the marginal value of capital. Consequently, the measurement of the response of
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(physical) investment to Q is biased in the absence of intangibles.1
However, current research is largely confined to the US market. To fill this void, this paper
investigates the reason behind the UK under-investment gap from the perspective of rising
intangibles. This paper follows the work of Crouzet & Eberly (2019) which consider intangible
capital as an omitted factor to explain the US investment shortfall. Building on the analysis of
Crouzet & Eberly (2019), this paper further explores the effects of intangibles on firm-level fixed
investment in three subpeiords and subsamples with different firm characteristics. This paper
presents empirical evidence suggesting that the transformation towards intangibles in the economy
provides a key component of an explanation of the UK under-investment puzzle. For example,
Fig.2 demonstrates that there have been negative time effects conditional on Q which started from
2002 and the gap further increased since the 2008 financial crisis. However, in the presence of
intangibles, the under-investment gap since 2002 can be reduced by approximately 70%. This
finding is considerably larger than that of Crouzet & Eberly (2019) which state that the US
firm-level investment gap only decreased one quarter by adjusting for intangibles.
Figure 2: Under-investment gap depicted by the time fixed effects from panel regressions of
investment on the beginning-of-period Q. The data source is Datastream.
The contribution of this paper is threefold: First, this paper confirms that the UK
under-investment puzzle can be explained by intangibles at the firm-level. The negative
1For more details, see Crouzet & Eberly (2019).
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association between intangibles and fixed investment is larger for firms with higher leverage, lower
tangibility and lower labour productivity. Second, this analysis contributes to distinguish the
relationship between intangibles and under-investment gap across three subperiods. Specifically,
the weak investment trend originated from 2002, which is long before the onset of the 2008
financial crisis. Whilst the under-investment gap since the financial crisis still exists, the results
suggest that adjusting for intangibles diminishes the under-investment gap by approximately 70%.
Finally, the efficacy of conventional monetary policy to boost investment can decline due to being
underpinned by the zero lower bound and characteristics of intangibles, e.g. low collateralizability
and low interest rate sensitivity. This paper provides policy implications by highlighting the
importance of utilising unconventional policies to stimulate investment.
2 Data
The sample consists of 620 UK non-financial firms from Datastream. The dataset of annual
observations is from 1992-2016. To mitigate potential survivor bias, selected firms have no fewer
than four consecutive years of data on any variables. Firms with a negative value of investment
and Q are excluded. The data is winsorized at the 1 and 99 percentiles to reduce outliers.
The baseline empirical specification is as follows:
Investmenti,t = β1Investmenti,t−1 + β2Qi,t−1 + β3Intangiblesi,t−1 + λΓ
′
i,t−1 +αt +αi + εi,t (1)
where Investmenti,t is capital expenditures (WC04601)
2 scaled by the beginning-of-period total
assets (WC02999). Investmenti,t−1 is included to allow for adjustment costs. Following Chung
& Pruitt (1994), Qi,t−1 (168E) is the ratio between the sum of the market value of equity plus
book value of preferred stock and debt to book value of total assets. Intangiblesi,t−1 are the
ratio of intangible assets (WC02649) to total assets. Following Lin et al. (2018), I control for
cash flow defined as the ratio of funds from operations (WC04201) to total assets and firm size
proxied by the natural logarithm of sales (WC01001) via a vector of firm-level variables, Γi,t−1. The
regression framework allows for time and firm fixed effects through αt and αi, respectively. εi,t is
an idiosyncratic error term.
3 Evidence
Table 1 presents the panel regression results obtained using three estimators: pooled OLS, fixed
effects and system GMM (Arellano & Bover (1995) and Blundell & Bond (1998)). As shown
in columns 1-3, the coefficient estimates for intangibles are negative and statistically significant
2Datastream code.
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at the 1% level. In particular, the largest magnitude of coefficient is reported by the system
GMM estimator. Columns 4-6 mimic the analysis of columns 1-3 whilst including firm controls.
The statistically significant negative association between intangibles and fixed investment holds
across the three estimators, indicating the explanatory power of intangibles are not diminished
by accounting for controls. The R2 of fixed effects regression in column 5 is 5.11% lower than
that of column 2 without controls.3 Column 6 shows that a one-unit increase in intangibles is
associated with a decrease in fixed investment by 0.0463-unit on average ceteris paribus. In contrast
to Gutiérrez & Philippon (2017) which show that intangibles are not significant at the firm-level,
Table 1 suggests that intangibles are negatively associated with the firm-level investment at the 1%
significance level across various estimators.
Table 1: Panel regressions: three estimators
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Investmenti,t−1 0.5808*** 0.3310*** 0.3700*** 0.5674*** 0.3190*** 0.3645***
(0.0217) (0.0228) (0.0252) (0.021) (0.0228) (0.0254)
Qi,t−1 0.0022*** 0.0050*** 0.0028** 0.0029*** 0.0050*** 0.0033***
(0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0011) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0011)
Intangiblesi,t−1 -0.0296*** -0.0187*** -0.0378*** -0.0306*** -0.0202*** -0.0463***
(0.0024) (0.0050) (0.0073) (0.0024) (0.0051) (0.0074)
Cash flowi,t−1 0.0273*** 0.0285*** 0.0337***
(0.0054) (0.0065) (0.0123)
Sizei,t−1 -0.00003 -0.0044*** -0.0010
(0.0002) (0.0012) (0.0011)
Observations 10534 10534 10534 10501 10501 10501
Firms 620 620 620 620 620 620
Estimation Method OLS FE Sys. GMM OLS FE Sys. GMM
R2 0.4523 0.4178 0.4555 0.3667
AR(2) p-value 0.381 0.477
Hansen-test p-value 0.255 0.101
Notes: This table presents the results from three estimators: pooled OLS, fixed effects and system GMM. The
dependent variable is Investmenti,t. Year dummies are included in all specifications. Robust standard errors are
in parenthesis. Hansen-test of the over-identifying restrictions is under the null that the instruments as a group are
exogenous. Lagged endogenous and predetermined variables are used as instruments. ***, **, * denote significance
at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
Conceivably the effects of intangibles on fixed investment vary across the three subperiods
identified in Fig.2. Table 2 investigates this time-varying effect by including the interactions of
3Hence the controls are not included in the subsequent estimations.
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intangibles with the subperiod dummies. The remaining analysis employs system GMM estimator
which corrects for the endogeneity and heterogeneity bias (Blundell & Bond 1998) thus providing
the most robust estimates. Column 1 of table 2 shows that the negative impact of intangibles is
significant at the 1% level throughout the three subperiods. To compare the magnitude of the
effects of intangibles on fixed investment across different subperiods, column 2 presents the
standardized coefficients. In particular, the standardized coefficient estimate pertaining to
intangibles in subperiod3 is the largest among three subperiods, which indicates that a one
standard deviation increase in intangibles leads to a 0.135 standard deviation decrease in fixed
investment ceteris paribus. This result is consistent with Fig.2 which shows that the size of the
under-investment gap can be largely reduced by controlling for intangibles over 2009-2016. It is
noteworthy that the US (e.g., Alexander & Eberly (2018)) and the UK share the similar pattern
of the under-investment gap characterised by three subperiods.






Intangiblesi,t−1 ∗ subperiod1 -0.0444*** -0.0452
(0.0117)
Intangiblesi,t−1 ∗ subperiod2 -0.0477*** -0.115
(0.0059)






Notes: Column 1 reports system GMM estimation results
obtained including the interactions of intangibles with the
subperiod dummies. Subperiod1, subperiod2, subperiod3
range from 1992-2001, 2002-2008 and 2009-2016, respectively.
Column 2 reports corresponding standardised coefficients.
Table 3 explores the robustness by partitioning firms based on the medians of: leverage, total
liabilities (WC03351) scaled by total assets; tangibility, property-plant-and-equipment (WC02501)
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scaled by total assets; and labour productivity, the natural logarithm of sales per employee
(WC07011). As shown in columns 1 and 2, the coefficient of intangibles for firms with higher and
lower leverage is -0.0399 and -0.0316, respectively. Whilst higher leverage does not guarantee that
firms are financially constrained per-se, it is a sign of difficulty in financing projects with external
funds. The results demonstrate that intangibles have a more statistically and economically
significant effect on firms subject to higher financial constraints. Since intangibles interact less
with interest rate changes than physical capital, it is important for policymakers to implement
supportive policies instead of relying on traditional monetary policy to promote business
investment. Columns 3 and 4 show that the coefficient estimates for intangibles are significantly
negative at the 1% level across the tangibility subsamples, albeit the estimated coefficient for firms
with lower tangibility is 0.4% greater than that of higher tangibility. As intangible-intensive firms
are usually associated with low asset tangibility, this result is broadly consistent with Crouzet &
Eberly (2019) which relate the weakness of the US physical investment to the rise in intangible
capital. In column 5, the negative relationship between intangibles and fixed investment holds up
for firms with higher labour productivity, which is statistically significant at the 1% level. Column
6 returns a negative coefficient on intangibles for firms with lower labour productivity of similar
magnitude for the full-sample result in column 3 of Table 1.
Table 3: Robustness checks
Leverage Tangibility Labour Productivity
High Low High Low High Low
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Investmenti,t−1 0.3818*** 0.3342*** 0.4395*** 0.3281*** 0.3787*** 0.3471***
(0.0469) (0.0418) (0.0329) (0.0450) (0.0379) (0.0347)
Qi,t−1 0.0029 0.0024 0.0033** 0.0029* 0.0019 0.0020
(0.0020) (0.0019) (0.0015) (0.0017) (0.0015) (0.0016)
Intangiblesi,t−1 -0.0399*** -0.0316** -0.0391*** -0.0431*** -0.0344*** -0.0381***
(0.0101) (0.0123) (0.0076) (0.0112) (0.0115) (0.0101)
Observations 5177 5357 5909 4625 5231 5303
Firms 310 310 310 310 311 309
AR(2) p-value 0.290 0.586 0.491 0.136 0.367 0.637
Hansen-test p-value 0.362 0.286 0.117 0.128 0.129 0.114




This paper documents that intangibles are negatively associated with firm-level investment and
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